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Prediction history

NATO x Russia military clash by December 31, 2026?

10/5/2026, 00:07:20 OpenAI
Model stance Watch Horizon To expiry Current price 21¢

At roughly 21% market probability, Yes appears modestly overpriced: the qualifying definition requires direct use of force, and only about two months remain. Escalation risk is real, so the estimate is uncertain; verified direct engagement would materially change it.

Note edge/置信度不足,规则判定观望

Triggers Verified direct use of force between NATO and Russian forces · A material escalation or de-escalation in NATO-Russia tensions · Time passing without a qualifying encounter
Yes bearish ↓ Edge -4% Confidence 52%

At roughly 21% market probability, Yes appears modestly overpriced: the qualifying definition requires direct use of force, and only about two months remain. Escalation risk is real, so the estimate is uncertain; verified direct engagement would materially change it.

10/3/2026, 06:09:02 OpenAI
Model stance Watch Horizon To expiry Current price 20.5¢

The remaining months and strict resolution criteria, which exclude warning shots, collisions, and many third-party interceptions, put the model estimate near 18%, below the 20.5% market price. Risk remains material; verified direct engagement or a major escalation would change the estimate.

Note edge/置信度不足,规则判定观望

Triggers Verified use of force between NATO and Russian forces · Material escalation or de-escalation · New credible reporting on direct engagement
Yes bearish ↓ Edge -2% Confidence 54%

The remaining months and strict resolution criteria, which exclude warning shots, collisions, and many third-party interceptions, put the model estimate near 18%, below the 20.5% market price. Risk remains material; verified direct engagement or a major escalation would change the estimate.

10/2/2026, 12:05:39 OpenAI
Model stance Watch Horizon To expiry Current price 22.5¢

I estimate the probability near 20.5%, slightly below the 22.5% market price. The remaining window is short and resolution requires direct use of force; recent price weakness is consistent with lower near-term risk, though limited context leaves substantial uncertainty.

Note edge/置信度不足,规则判定观望

Triggers Credible reports of direct NATO-Russia use of force · A material escalation or de-escalation in the conflict · Price movement that changes the implied probability substantially
Yes bearish ↓ Edge -2% Confidence 56%

I estimate the probability near 20.5%, slightly below the 22.5% market price. The remaining window is short and resolution requires direct use of force; recent price weakness is consistent with lower near-term risk, though limited context leaves substantial uncertainty.

9/30/2026, 00:06:45 OpenAI
Model stance Watch Horizon To expiry Current price 26.5¢

The model estimates Yes near 23%, modestly below the 26.5% market price. The strict requirement for direct use of force excludes warning shots, collisions, cyberattacks, and third-party drone interceptions, though escalation risk remains significant.

Note edge/置信度不足,规则判定观望

Triggers Reassess on credible reports of direct NATO-Russia use of force. · Reassess if meaningful de-escalation reduces the risk before expiry.
Yes bearish ↓ Edge -4% Confidence 56%

The model estimates Yes near 23%, modestly below the 26.5% market price. The strict requirement for direct use of force excludes warning shots, collisions, cyberattacks, and third-party drone interceptions, though escalation risk remains significant.

9/29/2026, 18:06:49 OpenAI
Model stance Watch Horizon To expiry Current price 27.5¢

A qualifying direct use-of-force incident remains possible amid the Russia-NATO confrontation, but the strict criteria exclude warnings, nonviolent airspace incidents, and many third-party interceptions.

Note edge/置信度不足,规则判定观望

Triggers Credible reports of direct NATO-Russia exchange of fire · A qualifying strike or armed interception · Clear diplomatic de-escalation
Yes bearish ↓ Edge -5% Confidence 58%

A qualifying direct use-of-force incident remains possible amid the Russia-NATO confrontation, but the strict criteria exclude warnings, nonviolent airspace incidents, and many third-party interceptions.